JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The engineers responsible for invention and mechanization in agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation are prominent historical figures, but few people are aware of the men who pioneered the sanitation systems so crucial to urbanization. As cities grew, their initial approaches to waste disposal and water supply proved unacceptable. As early as 1798 Benjamin Latrobe noted in his journal that the fresh groundwater which located the site of Philadelphia was befouled by the city's increasing population concentration. In Latrobe's opinion, Philadelphia's existing water-supply strategy was a major source of disease. Even before he assumed the responsibility for the city's new waterworks, Latrobe was convinced of the project's utility: " The great scheme of bringing the water of the Schuylkill to Philadelphia to supply the city is now become an object of immense importance, . . . though it is at present neglected from a failure of funds. The evil, however, which it is intended collaterally to correct is so serious and of such magnitude as to call loudly upon all who are inhabitants of Philadelphia for their utmost exertions to complete it."1 The emerging concentrations of population and manufacturing in the 19th century necessitated a reexamination of sanitation strategies. With urbanization, the haphazard approaches of the past could not guarantee pure water supplies and adequate waste disposal. Urban growth inevitably required the implementation of sanitation systems, and these systems, in turn, permitted further growth.
natural topography. A flat, nonporous terrain, slightly elevated from Lake Michigan and the Chicago River, made drainage and absorption nearly impossible. In rainy weather, the topsoil became swamplike. Urban growth required a drainage system which could remove both surface water and household wastes. The natural depository for such a drainage system was Lake Michigan; however, the lake was simultaneously the city's natural water-supply source. Lake water had to be conserved if it was to be potable, and this meant it had to be protected from urban wastes. Fortunately, beginning in the 1850s, Chicago's city fathers recognized pollution as a serious threat to the city's health and took immediate action. This paper investigates how Chesbrough responded to Chicago's anomalous water-supply and waste-disposal needs in the 1850s and 1860s, and inquires into his engineering education to discover the antecedents of his innovative ideas. Chesbrough's 1855 report considered four possibilities: (1) drainage directly into the Chicago River and then into Lake Michigan; (2) drainage directly into Lake Michigan; (3) drainage into artifical reservoirs to be pumped and used as fertilizer (sewage farming); and (4) drainage directly into the Chicago River, and then by a proposed steamboat canal into the Des Plaines River. Although this fourth possibility was the method which Chicago eventually adopted (the Chicago Sanitary District's Sanitary and Ship Canal), the city's 80,000 inhabitants in 1855 did not warrant the expense which this alternative involved.
I Ellis Sylvester Chesbrough was born of Puritan ancestry in
Chesbrough recommended the first plan.12 This is not to say he failed to realize that his preferred method was a potential health hazard, particularly during the warmer months, and might obstruct river navigation by making the waterways shallower.13 Chesbrough discussed the objections to his recommended alternative:
It is proposed to remove the first [health hazard] by pouring into the river from the lake a sufficient body of pure water into the North and South Branches to prevent offensive or injurious exhalations . . . The latter objection [obstruct navigation] is believed to be groundless, because the substances to be conveyed through the sewers to the river could in no case be heavier than the soil of this vicinity, but would generally be much lighter. While these substances might, to some extent, be deposited there when there is little or no current, they would, during the seasons of rain and flood, be swept on by the same force that has hitherto preserved the depth of the river.14 Apparently, Chesbrough did not realize that spring freshets and floods might force the sewers' accumulations into the lake in such a way as to pollute the city's water supply. This is somewhat surprising, as the basic sanitation principle of the day was to locate the eventual sewage outlet as far from the water-supply source as possible.
Chesbrough had three objections to the second possibility, drainage directly into Lake Michigan. First, it would require a greater sewer length and, consequently, would incur greater cost. Second, he supposed that this plan would seriously effect the water supply, if any sewer outlets were located near the pumping station. At this time, Chicago's water-supply intake was located a short distance offshore at the Chicago Avenue lakefront, approximately 1/2 mile north of the Chicago River's mouth. Chesbrough did not elaborate on this objection. Third, he felt drainage into the lake would create difficulties in preventing sewer outlet injury during stormy weather, or snow and ice obstruction during winter.15
Sewage farming was rejected in part because of the uncertainty whether future fertilizer demand would be sufficient to cover distribution costs. Further, Chesbrough was uncertain as to both the needed reservoir capacity and the expense of building the necessary reservoirs. Finally, Chesbrough thought there would be a great health hazard created by foul odors emanating from sewage spread over a wide surface.
Chesbrough termed the use of a steamboat canal not yet constructed to flush the sewage into the Des Plaines River, the fourth possibility, "too remote." Although he was aware of the "evils" which would result when raw sewage passed into Lake Michigan, Chesbrough felt it impossible to create an outlet to the southwest. and constantly flowing stream from Lake Michigan into the Illinois River, it is too remote a contingency to be relied upon for present purposes; besides the cost of it, or any other similar channel in that direction, sufficient to drain off the sewage of the city, would be not only far more than the present sewerage law provides for, but more than would be necessary to construct the sewers for five times the present population. Should the proposed steam-boat canal ever be made for commercial purposes the plan now recommended would be about as well adapted to such a state of things, as it is to the present.17 that a high grade was necessary for proper drainage and dry streets.
Chicago lacked this high grade, and, thus, the decision to raise the city's level, concomitant with sewer installation, was one which solved the waste disposal and drainage problem in the context of Chicago's existing topography and future necessities.20 The Chesbrough plan called for an intercepting sewer system which emptied into the Chicago River. The sewers were to be constructed on the combined system; that is, they would collect sewage from both buildings and streets. This was consistent with the best contemporary thinking and practice. As sewer construction progressed away from the river, the streets had to be raised beneath the sewers. After the sewers were laid, earth was filled in around them, entirely covering them. The packed-down fill provided roadbeds for new, higher streets. These streets were rounded in the center, with gutter apertures leading to the sewer. Such streets would stay dry and could be paved, as contrasted to the mud which had plagued the city previously.
A second facet of Chesbrough's sewerage plan involved dredging the Chicago River. The river had been dredged previously, but it was still too small to handle the anticipated sewage load. Chesbrough planned to widen and deepen the river, as well as to straighten its meandering course. Contracts for this work had been let to the partnership of John P. Chapin and Harry Fox. It was Fox who suggested using the dredgings from the river as fill around the sewers.21
It is interesting to digress on the consequences of Chesbrough's plan to raise the city. Where vacant lots existed, they were filled to the new level. A few old frame buildings were torn down, and the lots filled. It proved relatively easy to raise frame buildings to the new level, if the owners could afford it. The city's newer buildings were brick and stone, however, and they were constructed on the old level. These newer buildings would not be torn down, and many of 20 The grade which the city council adopted was lower than Chesbrough advocated, but it was sufficiently high to permit the construction of 7-8-foot cellars. The council's decision was to raise the grade to 10 feet on streets adjacent to the river; town on the southern coast of England." At one time this town of 5,000 had drained directly into the sea, "but owing to offensive smells caused by this practice, and the consequent injury to the reputation of town as a watering place, upon which its prosperity very much depends," Worthing decided to find an alternative sewerage scheme.30 Chesbrough concluded that Worthing's experience "shows that the mere discharge of filth into the sea gives no security against its being cast back in a more offensive state than ever, especially when the prevailing winds are toward shore," and that this suggests "the possibility of creating on the lake shore as great a nuisance as would be taken from the river."31 Second, Chesbrough included a prophetic paragraph which could serve as a summary to Chicago's sanitary history for a half century thereafter:
Under these circumstances it seems advisable to do nothing with regard to relieving the river at present, nor towards carrying out that portion of the plan which provides for forcing water from the lake into it, during the summer months. Should the Canal Company [the Illinois and Michigan Canal] not be obliged to pump enough during warm weather to keep the river from being offensive, it is understood that they would pump as much as they could for a reasonable compensation. This would furnish some criterion by which to judge of the probable effect of a still greater quantity driven in from the lake, according to the plan. The thorough [sic] cut for a steamboat canal, to the Illinois River, which the demands of commerce are calling more and more loudly for, if ever constructed, would give as perfect relief to Chicago as is proposed for London by the latest intercepting scheme.32 The Chicago River's south branch became quite polluted shortly after sewage was admitted into it. The Illinois and Michigan Canal's pumps, however, utilized south branch water to provide the canal's summit level, and, consequently, the pumps relieved a portion of the river's pollution load. following years, the canal's pumps were used regularly to relieve the pollution load. Further, the canal itself was deepened and additional pumps were installed to increase the canal's capacity for handling sewage. Finally, the Chicago Sanitary District was formed in order to construct a new and enlarged canal to service Chicago's waste disposal needs, as Chesbrough had prophesied.
In 1861 the Board of Public Works was formed by incorporating the duties of the Board of Sewerage Commissioners, the Board of Water Commissioners, and other miscellaneous departments. Chesbrough was named chief engineer of this new board and, consequently, inherited the water-supply problem in addition to the waste-disposal problem. His inheritance was the "vicious circle" created by Lake Michigan's dual role as water supplier and eventual waste disposer.
III
Chicago's continued population growth through the decade of the 1850s, the new sewerage works, and the expansion of packinghouses and distilleries had increased the number of pollutants drained into the Chicago River. Lake Michigan soon became fouled by the river's influx, and Chicagoans began to complain of the public water supply's offensiveness and pollution. The existing water intake was a wooden pipe which extended a few hundred feet out into Lake Michigan, 12 mile north of the Chicago River's mouth. In 1859, one of Chicago's water commissioners "proposed to sink a wrought iron pipe ... one mile out into the lake, to obtain the supply from a point which could not be affected by the river."34 Chesbrough was asked to study and report on the commissioner's plan, and to do the same on "erecting additional pumping works, in such locality as shall secure a supply of pure water."
Chesbrough's report discussed several methods without making a specific recommendation. Even at this early date, however, he considered a tunnel under the lake to be the most desirable alternative. Chesbrough was not afraid to combine grading, tunneling, and hydraulic principles to create a new water-supply system. When he later offered plans for a lake tunnel, his innovative proposal drew considerable opposition at the start and unmitigated acclaim when it proved successful.
Shortly after its formation in 1861, the Board of Public Works adopted as its goal the acquistion of an unpolluted water supply. Consequently, the board requested Chesbrough to make a canvass of the various water-supply possibilities and to investigate several filtration methods. Chesbrough dismissed the existing filtration methods as inadequate; his studied opinion was that the tunnel method was the most desirable:
The engineer of the Board [E. S. Chesbrough], after much doubt and careful examination of the whole subject, became more inclined to the tunnel plan than any other, as combining great directness to the nearest inexhaustible supply of pure water, with permanency of structure and ease of maintenance. The possibility, and, in the estimation of many, the probability of meeting insuperable difficulties in the nature of soil, or storms, or ice on the lake, were fully considered. One by one the objections appeared to be overcome, either by providing against them, or discovering that they had no real foundation.35
Chesbrough continued to explore the tunnel plan's potential. When he had worked out the details, a proposal was submitted to several engineers, all of whom considered the tunnel plan to be feasible. Nevertheless, the 1861 board was against adopting the project. After a new board was elected and additional soil examinations had been made, Chesbrough's water-supply tunnel plan was adopted. The new board reported:
What is most to be desired by the city is, that the supply should be drawn from the deep water of the lake, two miles out from the present Water Works.... The careful investigation of the subject has satisfied us sufficiently to say, that with our present knowledge, we consider it practicable to extend a tunnel of five feet diameter the required distance under the bed of the lake, the mouth or inlet to such a conduit being the outmost shaft, protected by a pier [crib], which will be used in the construction of the tunnel.36
In their 1863 report, the Board of Public Works noted that three projects had been considered, any one of which would have afforded Chicago a healthier and better protected water supply. These were (1) a 2-mile lake tunnel, (2) a filtering or settling basin, and (3) a 1-mile lake tunnel located 5 miles to the north.37 The board had two principal objections to the second plan. First, they commented: 35 Reported in Brown, p. 33. 36 Second Annual Report of the Board of Public Works to the Common Council of the City of Chicago (April 1, 1863) , p. 5, hereafter referred to as 1863 Report. 37 Cost estimates for each of the projects were as follows: 2-mile lake tunnel exclusive of light house, $307,552; a filtering or settling basin, $300,575; a 1-mile lake tunnel 5 miles to the north, $380,000 (1863 Report, p. 9).
For settling and filtering the water from sediment, we are of the opinion that the basin would be found effective, and would continue to be so, but that for filtration it is not safe to rely upon it. There have been filtering basins of the character in other places. Some of them appear to have continued to work well during long use, and others have failed and become useless.38 Second, the board objected to the basin scheme because the water supply intakes would still be in the shallow water close to shore, and would not be located in a deeper point where the water was considered to be better.
Chesbrough's 1863 report acknowledged that the board had considered the three most promising possibilities and had rejected one; he was to assess the remaining two. Almost immediately he dismissed, on the grounds of greater cost, any project which required moving the existing water works, such as the board's third proposal:
Other projects, such as erecting a new pumping works at Winnetka, or going to Crystal Lake and bringing a supply thence by simple gravitation, as is done for cities of New York, Boston, Baltimore, and Albany, have been considered, but their great cost, as compared with that of obtaining an abundant supply of good and wholesome water at points much nearer the city, is deemed a sufficient apology for not discussing their details here.39
Chesbrough concerned himself only with those plans which would bring water from a point 2 miles east of the existing Chicago Avenue Water Works, and there were two of these:
Of the plans proposed for obtaining water from the lake, where it will be free from not only the wash of the shore, but from the effects of the river, two classes only have been considered; one, an iron pipe with flexible joints; and the other, a tunnel under the bottom of the lake.40
Although the cost of the iron pipe project was slightly less than the tunnel project, Chesbrough chose between them on other than an initial cost basis:41
In consequence of the possibility of such a pipe being injured by anchors, by the sinking of a heavily loaded vessel over it, or by 38 Ibid., p. 8. 39 Ibid., p. 39. 40 Ibid. 41 Chesbrough roughly estimated the iron pipe scheme to cost $250,000. The choice seems to have been made on the basis of expected cost. Ibid., pp. 40 -41. the effect of an unusual current in the lake moving it from its place, it has been thought preferable to attempt the construction of a tunnel under the bottom of the lake.42
His research had convinced him that the tunnel's construction would be less difficult than was generally supposed. Lill and Diversey's brewery, adjacent to the waterworks, was the site of artesian borings which showed that, between 25 and 100 feet deep, the ground at the lake shore was a clay which was also found on the lake bottom where the water was 25 feet deep. A tunnel could easily be constructed in this type of clay, if it were continuous. Chesbrough was confident that the clay was continuous, but he admitted he was uncertain whether beds of sand might not be interspersed with the clay.43
The lake shaft was to be formed by sinking iron cylinders to the desired depth. Chesbrough noted that this was not a difficult problem in that the pneumatic process had been successfully employed on "the Theiss bridge in Hungary, and the railroad bridge across the Savannah River,... and recently the Harlem bridge in New York."44
In giving cost estimates for the tunnel project's component parts, Chesbrough clearly showed the sources of his research. The principal source was the Thames tunnel, and Chesbrough noted that the first thoughts of most people were the great construction difficulties and "enormous" costs which had been encountered on the Thames project. He was quick to refute these thoughts and countered that "as we have every reason to believe, the clay formation here would shield us from such inroads of water as were met within the Thames tunnel operation."45 In estimating excavation costs, Chesbrough made the same point: "There is good reason to believe that nothing in the soil here would be more difficult than that through which the sewers of London are sometimes tunneled."46 Chesbrough also used the Thames experience, plus that of the Boston Water Works tunnel, to estimate masonry costs. Cribs had been used principally in pier and breakwater construction, and Chesbrough based his crib cost estimates on figures which had been made for a proposed breakwater in Michigan City, Indiana, at the bottom of Lake Michigan.
After reports from (1) the commissioner of the Troy and Greenfield Railroad, and (2) the Hoosac Tunnel. Included in the commissioner's report was the report of Charles Storrow, who had been sent to investigate European tunnels. Because the tunnels which Storrow had studied were for railroads, they were all much larger than the one which Chesbrough was planning. Therefore, Chesbrough estimated the cost of each tunnel had it been constructed with a 5-foot width. From these estimates, he concluded that his cost estimate for the proposed water tunnel was reasonable. The engineering achievement involved in constructing the water-supply system was no less significant than that represented by Chesbrough's sewer system. As conceived, the task was to dig a shaft near the lake shore to a depth significantly below the lake bottom and then burrow 2 miles beneath the lake. A similar shaft was to be dug at the lake end and was to be protected by a crib. The engineering problem was to connect the shore and lake points by a straight line 69 feet below the surface of Lake Michigan. Contemporary compasses could not be used since, below ground level, local attraction rendered them inaccurate. To a worker in the tunnel, the only place where the direction of the line drawn between the two shafts could be observed was at the top of either shaft. Consequently, when the engineers attempted to run the tunnel's axis parallel to this imaginary line on the lake's surface, they ran into difficulties affecting the turn from shaft to tunnel. 48 When the lake shaft was completed, workers were lowered to begin burrowing westward to meet with the other workers burrowing eastward. The tunnel was sloped 2 feet per mile from the lake end to the shore so that it could be emptied should repairs prove necessary; the water would be shut off at the lake end. Although the methods were primitive-the tunnel was dug entirely by manual labor-it was claimed that the workers caused the two tunnel sections to meet within 1 inch of achieving a perfectly smooth wall.49
Chesbrough's engineering competence was coupled with a sense of economic reality, and these traits combined to insure the reputation he earned in Chicago. His 1863 report contained a section on "plans for improving the Chicago river." Chesbrough knew that moving the water-supply intake farther into the lake would not improve the river's offensive condition. In the 1855 sewerage report, he had argued that flushing canals would be necessary in both the north and south branches to purify the river, and he restated this treated effluent from Lake Michigan. Presently, Chicago is meeting its responsibility with respect to Lake Michigan pollution. On the other hand, both the Chicago River and the Illinois River valley are polluted because some industries in the Chicago area still discharge their wastes into the water and the Sanitary District falls short of 100 percent treatment. Approximately 10 percent of the sewage goes untreated at this time, but it is the district's stated objective to achieve 100 percent treatment in the 1970s. While these few sentences oversimplify a very complex situation, the outline is apparent.
Chicago must seek outside help to reduce Lake Michigan pollution and the consequent threat to the city's water supply. Chicago and its Cook County suburbs, by themselves, could significantly reduce pollution in the Chicago, Des Plaines, and Illinois rivers. When faced with Lake Michigan and Chicago River pollution in the 1850s and 1860s, Chicagoans had sought the best solutions available. Cost considerations had entered the argument only in deciding among equally effective methods; Chicagoans were not reluctant to pay the price necessary to secure sanitary conditions. They indebted the city through bond issues and themselves through tax assessments in order to finance these public works. Muddy streets and impure water were manifest physical representations of the city's problems, and solutions to these benefitted the city's residents, individually and collectively. The public's acceptance of an increased tax burden to finance these works must be viewed as public recognition of the problems' dimensions. If the city's water supply had not been conserved, and if the city's natural topography had not been improved, Chicago's urban growth would have been severely limited.
When the pollution problem is explored in a historical context, students will find that the objectives which Chesbrough soughtminimize pollution and obtain a pure water supply-are the same as today's objectives. Nineteenth-century engineers, however, were not faced with the imminent "death" of large bodies of water; they were faced only with protecting urban populations from polluted water supplies.
In studying Chesbrough's works in Chicago, one gets the impression that today's pollution problem is not the result of ignorance as to pollution's effects, but ignorance as to how deadly the pollution load has become. In many cases, techniques first utilized in the 1850s and 1860s are still used today. Although these techniques no longer solve the problems for which they were intended, their inadequacies did not become apparent until recently. Perhaps this is because the demands on these techniques were much less heavy during the earlier period than they now are. Perhaps it is because the engineers of Chesbrough's generation made such dramatic innovations that the declining effectiveness of these techniques and improvements just recently became evident to sanitary engineers and laymen. Or perhaps it is because the 20th-century sanitary engineers who recognize the problem are unable to communicate the necessity for action. While the technology and technicians have been available, an uninformed and apathetic public has not invested sufficient capital in pollution control. Whatever the case, through inaction, the cost of proper treatment has reached a price which may be greater than the public is willing to pay. Unfortunately, the 20th century has been unable to find a sanitary engineer with the same farsightedness in his method, and resoluteness in seeing his proposals adopted, as that characteristic of Ellis Sylvester Chesbrough.
